The topic of intentional interference with the person principally includes trespass to the person, the rule in Wilkinson v Downton and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. But other torts, such as the tort of intimidation applied in the modern slavery case of Godwin v Uzoigwe [1993] Fam Law 65, can very properly be thought of as covering intentional interference with the person.

Trespass to the person comprises three separate torts: battery, assault and false imprisonment. Battery and assault protect the right to bodily integrity. False imprisonment protects the right to freedom of movement. One feature of all three torts is the directness, or immediacy, of the interference with the claimant.

The rule in Wilkinson v Downton and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 complement the protection afforded by the trespass to the person torts. The former is relevant where personal injury is intentionally, but indirectly, inflicted on the claimant by the defendant. While the 1997 Act was primarily aimed at providing protection from stalking, its scope has proved to be much broader in practice.